Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't by Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't
Volume Author/Editor: Frederic S. Mishkin, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-53188-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/mish01-1
Conference Date: January 13-15, 2000
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics
in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms
Chapter Author: Randall S. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10762
Chapter pages in book: (p. 233 - 272)Randall S. Kroszner is professor of economics at the Graduate School of Business of the
University of Chicago, associate director of the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the
Economy and the State, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Philip E. Strahan is vice president in the Banking Studies Department of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York.
The authors thank Frederic Mishkin, Jeremy Stein, Thomas Stratmann, and conference
participants for suggestions on an earlier draft. Kroszner would like to thank both the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation for support from a grant to the George J. Stigler Center for
the Study of the Economy and the State and the University of Chicago Law School, where
he was the John M. Olin Visiting Fellow in Law and Economics when this was written. The
views expressed here are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the posi-
tion of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
 
7
Obstacles to Optimal Policy
The Interplay of Politics
and Economics in Shaping
Bank Supervision and
Regulation Reforms
Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan
7.1 Introduction
Economists analyzing depository institution supervision and regulation
typically have taken a normative approach and have generated numerous
reform proposals. Although agreement exists about the general direction
of welfare-enhancing reforms, how to pass and implement such reforms
has received much less analysis. This paper provides a positive political-
economy analysis of the most important revision of the U.S. supervision
and regulation system during the last two decades, the 1991 Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). We analyze the
impact of private interest groups and political-institutional factors on the
voting patterns concerning FDICIA to assess the empirical importance of
diﬀerent types of obstacles to welfare-enhancing reforms.
Rather than take regulations as given, the political economy approach
we employ here attempts to provide a positive analysis of how and why
regulations evolve as they do and what forces can lead to their durability,
as well as their potential for change. In section 7.2 we brieﬂy outline a
2331. Political scientists, however, have long understood and analyzed the impact of private
interest groups on policy outcomes (e.g., Schattscheider 1935), so the distinction between the
approaches of economists and political scientists is primarily for expository convenience.
number of approaches to understanding the political economy of govern-
ment involvement in the economy. In section 7.3 we apply these theories
to describe why, after little change since the end of the Great Depression,
legislative reform of bank regulation began in the 1980s. This section also
contains a brief review of the major legislative changes during the last
twenty years and provides a more detailed description of the legislative
history of FDICIA and its amendments.
In section 7.4 we outline hypotheses about the factors that should aﬀect
the support for FDICIA and the amendments generated by the positive
interest group and political approaches. Concerning private interest
groups, we focus on the contrasting interests of large versus small banks
(intraindustry rivalry), of banks versus insurance (interindustry rivalry),
and of consumers versus the banking industry. Concerning the political-
institutional factors, we explore the roles of legislator ideology, partisan-
ship, and congressional committees. We also provide the variable deﬁni-
tions in this section.
Section 7.5 describes our empirical voting model and contains the re-
sults. We analyze votes by members of the House of Representatives on
three amendments related to FDICIA and its ﬁnal passage. We ﬁnd con-
sistent support for the inﬂuence of both the intra- and interindustry rival-
ries on the outcomes but little role for consumer interests. Measures of
legislator ideology and partisanship also have an impact. For two of the
three amendments, the private interest group factors have greater explana-
tory power than do the political factors, and we ﬁnd the opposite for the
other amendment. Because both sets of factors do play a role, both should
be taken into account in order to implement successful change. A divide-
and-conquer strategy with respect to the private interests appears to be ef-
fective for bringing about legislative change. The concluding section draws
tentative lessons from the political economy approaches concerning ways
to make welfare-enhancing regulatory change more likely.
7.2 Alternative Approaches to the Political Economy of Regulation
Both policy reformers trying to eﬀect change as well as researchers try-
ing to develop positive theories of government policy making have tried to
understand the patterns of regulation and deregulation. Economists have
tended to emphasize the struggle between private interests and the public
interest in determining policy outcomes. Political scientists have tended to
emphasize the role of ideology and public opinion as well as the structure
of the legislative decision-making institutions in shaping outcomes.1 In this
section, we will brieﬂy outline these alternative positive approaches to ana-
234 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan2. Joskow and Noll (1981) call this normative analysis as positive theory.
lyzing regulatory change and describe some applications to understanding
aspects of banking and ﬁnancial regulation. Although these approaches
are not mutually exclusive, they emphasize diﬀerent aspects of the interac-
tion between economics and politics. Each captures an important element
in the process, and our empirical work will try to gauge their relative im-
portance.
7.2.1 Positive Economic Approaches:
Public Interest and Private Interest
Public Interest
The traditional approach that economists once took to explaining the
existence of regulation emphasized that regulations exist to correct market
failures and protect poorly informed consumers from harm.2 From this
perspective, regulatory intervention occurs primarily to maximize social
welfare, so this approach is often called the public interest theory of regu-
lation. Public interest rationales are given for capital regulation and de-
posit insurance to provide a sound banking system because stability of
the ﬁnancial system can have spillover eﬀects for general macroeconomic
performance (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig 1983; King and Levine 1993; Jay-
aratne and Strahan 1996; Kaufman and Kroszner 1997). Statutory protec-
tions of shareholders and creditors from ex post appropriation and super-
visory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are rationalized on the grounds of investor and consumer protection.
A key challenge to the public interest theory is that many forms of regu-
lation are hard to understand from a welfare-maximizing point of view.
Entry restrictions that protect banks or other ﬁnancial institutions from
competition, portfolio restrictions that hinder diversiﬁcation, deposit in-
surance systems that exacerbate moral hazard problems, and geographic
restrictions that have prevented expansion within a country or across na-
tional borders are generally diﬃcult to rationalize on public interest
grounds. Regulation that does not appear to serve a public interest also is
common in other sectors (see Stigler 1988).
Virtually all regulation, regardless of whether it may have a public in-
terest rationale, has signiﬁcant distributional consequences. The parties
aﬀected by the regulation thus have an incentive to try to ensure that the
government structures the regulation in such a way as to beneﬁt them. A
public interest argument is often used to mask the private interests that
the intervention serves. Private interests may try to confuse the public de-
bate by providing false or misleading information to make it diﬃcult to
discern whether policy would improve social welfare (e.g., Kane 1996; De-
watripont and Tirole 1999).
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or “logrolling” coalitions. Two groups may agree to support each other even if the members
of one group are not aﬀected by the regulations that the other wants. Tariﬀs are a classic
Private Interest
The private interest theory of regulation, also called the economic the-
ory of regulation, characterizes the regulatory process as one of interest
group competition in which compact, well-organized groups are able to
use the coercive power of the state to capture rents for those groups at the
expense of more dispersed groups (e.g., Olson 1965; Stigler 1971; Peltzman
1976, 1989; Becker 1983). Changes in the size, strength, and organization
of interest groups thus provide the key to understanding policy changes.
Regulated groups may be suﬃciently powerful that they inﬂuence the poli-
ticians and the regulatory bureaucracy to serve primarily the interests of
those subject to the regulation.
The incentives for such regulatory behavior may be direct or indirect.
Pressure may be exerted directly on politicians through campaign contri-
butions or votes. The politicians then pass a new statute or pressure the
regulators to act sympathetically toward the interest group. Indirect incen-
tives may come through regulators’ understanding that cooperative behav-
ior may be rewarded with lucrative employment opportunities in the indus-
try after such supportive regulators leave the government.
The eﬀectiveness of the interest groups depends on a number of factors.
First, cohesive groups will ﬁnd it easier to organize and overcome free-
rider problems in lobbying for regulations that may beneﬁt them. Produc-
ers of goods and services tend to be more compact and better organized
than consumers, so there is a tendency for regulation on net to beneﬁtp r o -
ducers more than consumers (Stigler 1971). As we discuss in more detail
later, interests within an industry or section may not be homogeneous, and
in such cases competition among well-organized and well-funded corpo-
rate interests can oﬀset the tendency for regulation to beneﬁt producers.
A group’s ability to organize is often inversely related to its size, but many
labor unions and trade organizations have been able to develop eﬀective
lobbying bodies through carefully crafted incentives that provide a variety
of information and support services in return for membership (see Olson
1965).
Second, groups tend to be more eﬀective not only when the beneﬁts
are concentrated among group members but also when the costs of the
regulation are relatively diﬀuse. A compact group of potential losers, each
of whom would experience high losses associated with the regulation, will
be likely to form a lobby that will try to counteract the original interest
group’s pressure. Interest groups most directly aﬀected by the regulation
may attempt to build a large coalition to support or oppose the regulation.3
236 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahancase of logrolling, in which, say, lumber and glass producers support each other’s call for
higher protection, thereby providing greater support for higher tariﬀs than otherwise would
be (Schattscheider 1935; Irwin and Kroszner 1996).
4. Becker (1983) argues that competition among lobbying groups thus will lead to the
selection of the most eﬃcient (lowest deadweight cost) regulations, so there is a tendency for
regulation to be eﬃcient in this sense. Wittman (1995) takes this argument further to con-
clude that both democratic institutions and outcomes are eﬃcient. On why not all welfare-
enhancing reforms may be realized in the political arena, see Rodrik (1996), Rajan and Zin-
gales (forthcoming), and Kroszner (2000b).
5. When the constraint of future elections is less binding on politicians, they may engage
in less rent sharing and provide windfalls to targeted groups. McGuire and Olson (1996),
however, argue that less democratic regimes may be better able to insulate themselves from
rent seeking and might ﬁnd it in their own interests to pursue economic policies in the pub-
lic interest.
6. In addition, ﬂat-rate deposit insurance tends to subsidize the smaller and riskier banks
at the expense of the larger, better diversiﬁed, and safer banks. Lobbying for ﬂat-rate de-
posit insurance (and for continued protection against geographic diversiﬁcation through
branching) has historically been consistent with this pattern of relative beneﬁts (e.g., White
1983; Calomiris and White 1994; Economides, Hubbard, and Palia 1996; Kroszner 1997).
7. See Kroszner (1999a; 2000a,b), for how this may make the banking and ﬁnancial system
susceptible to political inﬂuence.
8. Politicians and the bureaucracy may be considered a distinct interest group concerned
about expanding their size and inﬂuence over the economy. Niskanen (1971) and Brennan
Competition among organized interests is typical, particularly in the ﬁ-
nancial services area (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998).
Third, in addition to the diﬀusion of the costs across diﬀerent groups,
the level of the costs relative to the beneﬁts obtained by the interest group
plays an important role (Becker 1983). Deadweight loss is deﬁn e da sp r e -
cisely the diﬀerence between the winner’s beneﬁt and the loser’sc o s tf r o m
the change in output generated by the regulation. Factors aﬀecting the “ef-
ﬁciency” of the regulatory or transfer mechanism thus may have an impor-
tant impact on political outcomes. As the deadweight loss grows, for ex-
ample, the losers are losing more for each dollar of the winner’s gain. When
this gap widens, losers have a greater incentive to ﬁght each dollar of the
winner’s gain, and the winners have less incentive to ﬁght for each dollar
of the loser’s loss. In other words, when deadweight losses are high, an in-
terestgroupfacesgreateroppositiontoitsprotectiveregulationonthemar-
gin and hence is less likely to be successful.4
Similarly, politicians in electoral democracies are concerned about ﬁnd-
ing an optimal support coalition to promote their reelection chances, so
they take into account the marginal costs and beneﬁts to diﬀerent groups.
The rents generated by regulation in an electoral democracy are thus likely
to be spread among diﬀerent groups, even though one group may be the
primarybeneﬁciary(Peltzman1976).5Regulationthatprotectsﬁnancialin-
stitutions from competition and subsidized government deposit insurance6
generates rents for this sector that may be partially shared through directed
credit allocation.7 Competition among rival interests may then inﬂuence
the extent and identity of the winners and losers.8
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 237and Buchanan (1977) suggest that an objective of the government may be to maximize or,
on the margin, to increase its size and expenditures, and they discuss institutional structures
that can mitigate the tendency toward growth. This view has been characterized as the Levia-
than approach.
9. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) create an ideology measure that locates each legislator on
a simple left-right scale based on their complete history of roll-call votes. In our empirical
work we use the ADA rating, which is based on selected roll-call votes. For our time period,
the ADA and the Poole and Rosenthal measures are highly correlated.
7.2.2 Positive Political-Institutional Approaches
Ideology
Although the private interest theory has had much success in explaining
a wide variety of regulatory interventions that are diﬃcult to rationalize
on public interest grounds, it has been less eﬀective in explaining the wide-
spread economic deregulation that has taken place in many countries dur-
ing the last two decades (Peltzman 1989 and Noll 1989; but see Kroszner
and Strahan 1999). Many political scientists and some economists empha-
size the importance of beliefs and ideologies of voters and politicians to
explain regulation and deregulation (e.g., Kalt and Zupan 1984; Poole and
Rosenthal 1997). Diﬀerences across countries or among citizens over time
in their general beliefs about the appropriate role of the government in
economic aﬀairs might aﬀect the extent of intervention. Roe (1994), for
example, has argued that populist fear of excessive concentration of power
in the hands of ﬁnancial elites was an important driving force behind many
banking and ﬁnancial regulations in the early part of this century (but see
Hellwig 1999 for an alternative interpretation).
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have undertaken a systematic analysis of
votingpatternsintheU.S.Congressandarguethatideologyisthekeytoex-
plaining roll-call voting.9 They have had much success in accounting for a
wide variety of economic regulation and deregulation that is not well ex-
plained by private interest group variables or party politics.
PooleandRosenthal(1993),forexample,ﬁndanimportantroleforideol-
ogy in the legislative battles over federal economic regulation in the United
States during the nineteenth century. Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast
(1989) had argued that economic interests of constituents were the key to
explaining the origins and passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
whichwastheﬁrstsigniﬁcantpieceoffederalregulationofprivatecorpora-
tions and initiated the “age of economic regulation.” When Poole and Ro-
senthal (1993) included their measures of legislator ideology in the vote
prediction regressions, however, the economic interest variables were much
diminished in eﬀect and had low incremental explanatory power relative
to ideology. In addition, Berglof and Rosenthal (1999) analyze bankruptcy
law in the United States and argue that ideology is a key element for under-
238 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan10. On the political economy of bankruptcy, see also Posner (1997), Bolton and Rosenthal
(1999), and Kroszner (1999b).
standing the voting patterns on bankruptcy legislation during the last two
centuries.10 In the empirical work following, we will examine the incremen-
tal explanatory power of private interest and political factors.
Identifying the driving forces behind changes in ideology over time,
however, has been diﬃcult. What constitutes the term ideology and
whether it can be measured independent of private economic interests are
the subjects of an extensive and ongoing controversy (see Kalt and Zupan
1984 and Peltzman 1984; and overviews by Bender and Lott 1996 and
Poole and Rosenthal 1996).
Institutions
The new institutional economics approach emphasizes transactions
costs and institutional arrangements for decision making as key factors
inﬂuencing the outcome of the policy process (e.g., McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast 1988; North 1990; Williamson 1996; Alston, Eggertsson, and
North 1996; Dixit 1996; Irwin and Kroszner 1999). This approach exam-
ines how alternative policy-making structures inﬂuence the incentives of
both special interests and governmental actors to shape policy. These insti-
tutional and transactions costs features can in turn aﬀect both the incen-
tives for interest groups to organize and the eﬀectiveness of their lobbying
eﬀorts. Interest group size and strength, thus, is not given but may be en-
dogenous, and it is important to take such considerations into account
to understand how durable policy change comes about (e.g., Irwin and
Kroszner 1999).
The committee structure of Congress creates opportunities for vote trad-
ing and issue linkages that may aﬀect coalition formation and policy out-
comes (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988).
The selection process for committee membership may lead committees to
be composed of “preference outliers” who are not representative of Con-
gress as a whole but, by virtue of their gatekeeping control over legislation
in their jurisdiction, may have a disproportionate impact on outcomes
(e.g., Shepsle 1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1995). Alternatively, committees
may not consist of outliers and may operate as delegated groups to carry
out the major party’s agenda or as groups of policy experts who gather
and process information in order to make well-informed decisions (Hall
and Grofman 1990; Krehbeil 1991; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox
and McCubbins 1993). The standing committees also may function as re-
peat-dealing devices that permit legislators to develop credible policy posi-
tions, and this process then helps the legislators to maximize special inter-
est contributions (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998).
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Year
Passed Major Provisions of the Law
Depository Institutions 1980 Raised deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000.
Deregulation and Imposed uniform reserve requirements on all
Monetary Control Act depository institutions. Gave access to Federal
(DIDMCA) Reserve services to all depository institutions. Phased
out interest rate ceilings. Allowed depositories to oﬀer
NOW and ATS accounts nationwide. Eliminated usury
ceilings.
Garn St Germain Act 1982 Permitted banks to purchase failing banks and thrifts
across state lines. Expanded thrift lending powers.
Allowed depositories to oﬀer money market deposit
accounts.
Competitive Equality in 1987 Allocated $10.8 billion in additional funding to the
Banking Act (CEBA) FSLIC. Authorized forbearance program for farm
banks. Reaﬃrmed that the full faith and credit of the
Treasury stood behind deposit insurance.
Financial Institutions 1989 Provided $50 billion of taxpayers’ funds to resolved
Reform, Recovery and failed thrifts. Eliminated the FSLIC and the Federal
Enforcement Act Home Loan Bank Board (the former regulator of
(FIRREA) thrifts). Created the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision to
regulate and supervise thrifts. Raised deposit
insurance premiums. Mandated that the deposit
insurance fund reach 1.25 percent of insured deposits.
Reimposed restrictions on thrift lending activities.
Directed Treasury to study deposit insurance reform.
Source: Mishkin (1997) and FDIC (1997).
7.3 Legislative Reforms of Bank Supervision and Regulation:
Why Do They Occur in the 1980s and 1990s?
Although our main focus will be on the 1991 FDICIA, it is important
to investigate whether the positive theories outlined earlier can help ex-
plain the general timing of bank regulatory change. From the end of the
Depression through the 1970s, there was little reform of the statutes gov-
erning the supervision and regulation of the banking sector. As table 7.1
shows, federal legislative change began in 1980. At the same time, states
were relaxing restrictions on branching and interstate banking. In the
1990s, regulatory change continued with reform of the ﬁnancial safety net
(FDICIA in 1991), deregulation of restrictions on branching (the Inter-
state Branching and Banking and Eﬃciency Act of 1994), and deregula-
tion of the separation of banking and underwriting (the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999).
Technological, economic, and legal shocks disrupting the long-standing
political-economy equilibrium can explain why regulatory change began in
240 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan11. The one exception is the ﬁnal vote on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which passed with 77 percent of the House vote.
the early 1980s. Economic shocks such as rising interest rates and greater
competition from the commercial paper and junk bond markets reduced
the proﬁtability and capital of banks and thrifts. Because banks and thrifts
had less capital at stake, the moral hazard problem associated with deposit
insurance worsened in the 1980s, thereby making regulatory changes de-
signed to enhance both regulatory and market discipline in the public in-
terest. At the same time, new technologies such as automatic teller ma-
chines (ATMs) and credit scoring models for lending reduced the strength
of small banks—the traditional beneﬁciaries of deposit insurance and re-
strictions on banks’ abilities to expand geographically—relative to large
banks. These changes thus set the stage for the regulatory change. We
examine these forces later and provide a brief description of the substance
of the changes that occurred during the 1980s in section 7.3.1.
Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 then describe FDICIA and its legislative history
in detail. We choose this focus for three reasons. First, this act represents
the most signiﬁcant revision to the rules governing federal banking super-
vision and regulation since the Great Depression. Second, votes on other
important pieces of legislation dealing with banking supervision and regu-
lation were either voice votes (hence leaving no record to analyze) or so
nearly unanimous that there would not be suﬃcient variation to do sys-
tematic empirical analysis.11
The third reason for this focus is that the legislative history of FDICIA
allows us to examine roll-call votes on a number of amendments in addi-
tion to ﬁnal passage. Amendments have the advantage of being more nar-
rowly focused than the ﬁnal bill, thereby making it easier to determine how
diﬀerent interests would be aﬀected. Final bills tend to be the outcome of
coalition-building processes that provide an equilibrium balance among
interests, so it may be diﬃcult to identify groups that unambiguously lose
(see, e.g., Irwin and Kroszner 1996). This may be one reason why so much
legislation that ultimately passes does so on a voice vote or with near una-
nimity (see Krehbeil 1998).
7.3.1 Why Does Bank Regulatory Reform Begin in the 1980s?
A series of technological and economic changes altered the value of the
traditional bank regulations and aﬀected the relative strengths of the rival
interest groups. The development and spread in the 1970s and 1980s of the
checkable money market mutual fund, the Merrill Lynch Cash Manage-
ment Account, and other opportunities to bank by mail or phone using
toll-free numbers, for example, created new competition for bank deposi-
tors’ funds. In addition, high inﬂation in the late 1970s and early 1980s led
to high interest rates, but depository institutions were not able to oﬀer
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 24112. The elimination of interest rate ceilings on large denomination certiﬁcates of deposit
during the 1970s appears to have hurt smaller and retail-oriented banks relative to larger,
wholesale banks (James 1983).
13. On the political economy of the thrift crisis, see Romer and Weingast (1991).
competitive rates due to Regulation Q interest rate ceilings. What had once
been a device supported by the industry to eliminate price competition
had become a burden as the new alternatives to bank deposits oﬀered
market rates.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 (DIDMCA) and the Garn St Germain Act of 1982 both attempted
to stem the ﬂow of funds out of ﬁnancial intermediaries and increase their
proﬁtability. DIDMCA raised deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000
and phased out the Regulation Q interest rate ceilings.12 Garn St Germain,
in addition to permitting banks to purchase failing thrifts regardless of
their location, substantially loosened lending restrictions on thrifts. To-
gether, these two laws laid the groundwork for the rapid growth of the
thrift industry in the middle of the 1980s, despite the massive decline in
economic capital that led to severe moral hazard problems. High interest
rates caused a substantial decline in the capital of thrifts whose portfolios
consisted mainly of long-term ﬁxed rate mortgages. The decline in regional
real estate values (e.g., in the Southwest after the collapse of the oil indus-
try in the early 1980s) continued to reduce the true net worth of thrifts
even after interests rates came down in the mid-1980s. In conjunction with
these laws, forbearance by the thrift regulators allowed many economically
insolvent thrifts to “gamble for resurrection” (Kane 1989; Kroszner and
Strahan 1996).
By the middle of the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that the Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) had become insolvent.
By then, concern about the solvency of the FSLIC had led to increases in
interest rates paid on fully insured deposits at weak thrifts (Strahan 1995).
After lobbying by the thrift industry that delayed action, the 1987 Compet-
itive Equality in Banking Act took the ﬁrst step toward bolstering the
FSLIC by allocating $10.8 billion to help resolve failed thrifts and by re-
aﬃrming that the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury stood behind
the fund.13 The insolvency of FSLIC continued to deepen as the industry
became weaker (and, consequently, became a less powerful lobbying force)
and as the cost of the regulatory regime became clearer to the public (Kane
1996). The 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act (FIRREA) allocated signiﬁcantly more funds to resolve failed
thrifts. FIRREA also changed and tightened the regulatory authority over
thrifts and directed the Treasury to study more signiﬁcant reforms of the
deposit insurance system.
242 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan7.3.2 FDICIA: An Important Step toward
Improved Supervision and Regulation
FDICIA represents a broad-based attempt to improve the ﬁnancial
safety net by minimizing the moral hazard problems that come with pro-
tecting various classes of stakeholders when banks get into trouble (see
table 7.2). Flat-rate deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to in-
crease risk in order to raise the value of that insurance (Merton 1977).
FDICIA addresses this problem directly by mandating risk-based premi-
ums on deposit insurance. FDICIA also enhanced both regulatory and
market discipline over banks’ tendencies to take too much risk. The law
ﬁrst enhanced regulatory discipline by prescribing mandatory annual on-
site exams of all insured depository institutions and requiring accounting
principles applicable to all insured depositories to be uniform and consis-
tent. Both of these changes stemmed from the experience of the thrift
industry during the 1980s, when regulatory resources were cut and ac-
counting standards substantially liberalized to conceal large losses (Kane
1989; Kroszner and Strahan 1996).
Table 7.2 Description of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA) and Amendment Votes
Major Provisions of the Law
FDICIA Increased the FDIC’s authority to borrow from Treasury by $30 billion.
Imposed risk-based deposit insurance pricing. Outlined procedure for
Prompt Corrective Action of weakly capitalized banks and thrifts.
Directed the FDIC to resolve failed banks and thrifts in the least
costly way to the deposit insurance fund. Mandated annual on-site
examinations and accounting reform. Increased the Fed’sr o l ei n
supervising foreign banks.
Wylie-Neal Amendment An amendment to permit bank holding companies to purchase banks in
any state nationwide, and to permit national banks to open branches
across state lines. The amendment also restricted national banks’
ability to sell certain insurance products.
Wylie Amendment An amendment to limit federal deposit insurance coverage for depositors
to one account of up to $100,000 per person per institution and an
additional $100,000 per person per institution for an IRA account.
The amendment would eliminate FDIC coverage for multiple accounts
of $100,000 in a single ﬁnancial institution.
Kennedy Amendment An amendment to require banks which are authorized to buy or open
branches in other states to demonstrate that they are meeting the
existing credit needs of the community where they are currently
established and to prohibit banks with assets of more than $1 billion
from expanding to adjoining states if those banks have exhibited a
pattern of closing oﬃces in low- and moderate-income locations, thus
eﬀectively levying a “tax” on interstate acquisitions.
Source: Mishkin (1997) and FDIC (1997).
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 24314. The capital zones are well-capitalized (total capital-to-risk weighted assets  10 per-
cent, Tier 1 capital ratio  6 percent, and leverage ratio  5 percent); adequately capitalized
(total capital-to-risk-weighted assets  8 percent, Tier 1 ratio  4 percent, leverage ratio 
4 percent); undercapitalized (total capital-to-risk-weighted assets  6 percent, Tier 1 ratio
 3 percent, leverage ratio  3 percent); signiﬁcantly undercapitalized (total capital-to-risk-
weighted assets  6 percent, Tier 1 ratio  3 percent, leverage ratio  3 percent); and criti-
cally undercapitalized (leverage ratio  2 percent).
15. Benston and Kaufman (1994, 1998) argue, however, that the law did not go far enough
to reduce regulatory discretion.
FDICIA further enhanced regulatory discipline by directing the bank-
ing agencies to impose increasingly tighter restrictions on bank activities
as capital declined under the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) section.
PCA deﬁnes ﬁve capital zones: well capitalized, adequately capitalized,
undercapitalized, signiﬁcantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapi-
talized.14 As banks fall from the well to adequately capitalized zones, the
FDIC must approve their use of brokered deposits. As they fall from ade-
quate to undercapitalized, banks must suspend dividend payments, outline
a capital restoration plan, and restrict asset growth, and are prohibited
from using brokered deposits. Falling from undercapitalized to signiﬁ-
cantly undercapitalized, FDICIA restricts interaﬃliate transactions and
deposit interest rates, and limits payments to bank oﬃcers. Finally, when
a bank falls into the critically undercapitalized zone, a receiver or conser-
vator must take control of the bank. This provision likely reduces the prob-
lem of regulatory forbearance by limiting discretion.15
In some prominent cases during the 1980s, all creditors of failing banks
were bailed out by the FDIC, and this policy was even made explicit (Kros-
znerand Strahan 1996). Under such circumstances, bank creditors are not
likely to worry about the risks of insolvency, thus worsening the moral
hazard problem and encouraging excessive risk taking by large banks.
FDICIA addresses this lack of market discipline by directing the FDIC
to use the least costly method to resolve troubled or insolvent institutions.
Least-cost resolution means that in most cases the FDIC will have to im-
pose losses on uninsured creditors (e.g., subordinated debtholders) and
depositors that are less than fully insured. Knowing that the FDIC is di-
rected to resolve failed banks using the least costly approach, these large
creditors have an ex ante incentive to impose discipline on a bank’st e n -
dency to take too much risk, by both pricing that risk at the outset and
withdrawing funds when the bank experiences ﬁnancial problems.
Although FDICIA’s provisions did work to reduce the moral hazard
problems associated with deposit insurance, signiﬁcant issues were not ad-
dressed (for critical assessments, see Benston and Kaufman 1994, 1998).
Many analysts during the debate over FDICIA, for example, recom-
mended that market value accounting principles replace historical cost
accounting to improve the information content in capital ratios as an early
warning signal of insolvency. With market value accounting, banks can be
244 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan16. An important question is why FDICIA occurred when it did rather than years earlier.
Its passage following the rapid increase in bank and thrift failure in the 1980s raises the
question of whether signiﬁcant regulatory change can only occur, or perhaps is most likely
to occur, following a crisis. Following large losses, public awareness of the costliness of having
government-insured but (geographically) undiversiﬁed ﬁnancial institutions likely increased.
In the late 1970s the failure rate of banks began to rise, and in the 1980s the thrift crisis and
taxpayer bail-out in FIRREA heightened public awareness about the costs of restrictions
that make depository institutions more likely to require infusions of taxpayer funds. The
failures thus may have heightened public support for branching (Kane 1996). Although this
argument seems plausible and can account for the timing of FDICIA, it is diﬃcult to docu-
ment systematically. For example, banking failures or distress in a state did not aﬀect the
speed at which the state deregulated (Kroszner and Strahan 1999). More generally, an eco-
nomic crisis within a sector is rarely distributionally neutral (Olson 1982). The economic
shock could thus have changed the relative importance of diﬀerent interest groups and
thereby led to change in the banking regulatory equilibrium (see Kroszner 1998a; 2000a,b).
closed before signiﬁcant losses become large, thereby reducing the costs of
the deposit insurance. In addition, in response to interest rate risks taken
on by many thrifts during the 1980s, FDICIA directed the regulators to
account for this risk in capital adequacy requirements but provided little
direction about how this would be accomplished. In the end, interest rate
risk assessment was left entirely to supervisors on a case-by-case basis.16
7.3.3 Legislative Battles over Amendments with Roll-Call Votes
FDICIA emerged out of a debate on safety net reform on House Resolu-
tion 6 during 1991. H.R. 6 contained sections that would have allowed
interstate branching deregulation and sections on ﬁnancial services mod-
ernization that would have eliminated the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 by
permitting bank holding companies to operate aﬃliates in banking, securi-
ties, and insurance. H.R. 6 also contained sections on safety and sound-
ness reform and deposit insurance coverage. Both the interstate branch-
ing and ﬁnancial modernization sections of H.R. 6 were subsequently
dropped prior to passage of FDICIA, but we were able to identify three
amendment votes that occurred during the debate over H.R. 6. We analyze
each of these amendment votes in addition to analyzing the ﬁnal vote on
FDICIA.
Wylie-Neal Amendment
The ﬁrst of these votes, on the Wylie-Neal Amendment, would have
allowed banks to set up branches in other states, thereby improving diver-
siﬁcation of the industry and increasing ﬁnancial stability. Relaxation of
restrictions on branch banking had been occurring at the state level during
the 1970s and 1980s as changes in technological and economic conditions
altered the political-economy equilibrium that had kept antibranching reg-
ulations little changed for at least thirty years (see Kroszner and Strahan
1999). In addition to the development of the checkable money market mu-
tual fund mentioned previously, two other innovations reduced the value
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helped erode the geographic ties between customers and banks. Second,
technological innovation and deregulation reduced transportation and
communication costs, particularly since the 1970s, thereby lowering the
costs for customers using distant banks. By increasing the elasticity of de-
posits supplied to banks, these innovations reduced the value of geograph-
ical restrictions to their traditional beneﬁciaries and thereby reduced their
incentives to ﬁght to maintain them (Peltzman 1976).
On the lending side, increasing sophistication of credit-scoring tech-
niques, following innovations in information processing and ﬁnancial the-
ory as well as the development of large credit databases, began to diminish
the value of knowledge that local bankers had about the risks of borrowers
in the community. As a result of these innovations, a national market has
developed for residential mortgages; credit card receivables have been sec-
uritized; and bank lending to small business now relies less on the judg-
ment of loan oﬃcers and more on standardized scoring models.
These changes have increased the potential proﬁtability for large banks
to enter what had been the core of small bank activities. Large banks’
incentives to increase their lobbying pressure to expand into these markets
has thus been increasing over time. In fact, small banks’ market share
began to decline even prior to the branching deregulation (Kroszner and
Strahan 1999). As the value of local banking relationships declined, small
ﬁrms that were the main borrowers from the small banks also probably
became more likely to favor the entry of large banks into local markets.
With the deadweight costs of preventing the rise of large bank entry, the
private interest theory predicts that small local banks would likely become
less able to maintain the branching restrictions (Becker 1983). Deregula-
tion that reduces deadweight costs of regulation is consistent also with the
public interest theory. The marginal value of lobbying to repeal branching
restrictions increased just as the relative value to the small banks of main-
taining branching restrictions was declining.
Several details of the Wylie-Neal interstate branching amendment illus-
trate the inﬂuence of interest group politics. For example, the Independent
Bankers Association of America, which represents small banks, “strongly
opposes the bill, saying it threatens the availability of credit for farmers,
ranchers, small businesses, and consumers in rural America” (BNA Bank-
ing Reporter, 9/16/91). Perhaps to placate such opposition, the Wylie-Neal
interstate branching provision prohibits banks from using interstate oﬃces
for deposit production purposes and requires the banking regulatory agen-
cies to set up guidelines to ensure that interstate branches are used to meet
the needs of the community in which they operate.
The Wylie-Neal Amendment also included signiﬁcant concessions to
the insurance industry, which had been losing its battle with the banking
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rency decided to allow national banks to sell any type of insurance prod-
uct from small towns. This authority was later upheld by the U.S. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Independent Insurance Agents of America v.
Ludwig in 1993. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed banks to sell
annuities nationwide (Valic v. Clarke), and then in 1996 the Supreme Court
again expanded banks’ insurance powers by ruling in the Barnett Banks v.
Nelson case that states could not bar national banks from selling insurance
products from small towns (Seiberg 1996). Wylie-Neal would have scaled
back somewhat on bank insurance powers. National banks would be
barred from engaging in title insurance, and their ability to sell insurance
from small towns of 5,000 or less would have been restricted. In addition,
the amendment would limit states’ abilities to allow banks to sell insurance
products into other states (BNA Banking Reporter, 8/19/91).
Wylie Amendment
We have also identiﬁed a roll-call vote on deposit insurance coverage.
This provision, also brought by Wylie, would have scaled back deposit
insurance to $100,000 per person per institution, rather than $100,000 per
account. This measure, along with provisions designed to eliminate deposit
insurance coverage for brokered deposits, was supported by the adminis-
tration; its defeat was considered a “signiﬁcant setback to . . . eﬀorts to
achieve deposit insurance reform” (BNA Banking Reporter, 8/19/91). In
the ﬁnal law, however, regulatory agencies could restrict troubled institu-
tions from issuing brokered deposits and paying interest rates signiﬁcantly
above rates oﬀered on comparable deposits.
The move to scale back deposit insurance marked a sharp change from
previous trends and, like the move to unrestricted branching, reﬂected the
declining inﬂuence of small banks relative to large. Deposit insurance cov-
erage had been increased in 1950 (from $5,000 to $10,000), in 1966 (to
$15,000), in 1969 (to $20,000), in 1974 (to $40,000), and in 1980 (to
$100,000). White (1998) argues that small banks supported each of these
increases, whereas large banks opposed them. As a result, the real value
of deposit insurance rose from $5,000 (1934 dollars) initially to $10,000–
15,000 during the 1970s. Since 1980, inﬂation has eroded the real value of
deposit insurance by about 50 percent. Despite this decline, there has been
no serious call to raise the limits on insurance over the past two decades
because, as we argued earlier, new technologies have increased the ability
of large banks to operate in many markets even in the face of regulatory
barriers. These changes have weakened the political inﬂuence of smaller
banks, creating an environment in which they would rather sell out to large
banks at a high price than ﬁght to maintain restrictions on branching and
a generous deposit insurance system.
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tion Act of 1999 (i.e., the Glass-Steagall repeal) were arguments over expansion of the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act to a ﬁnancial holding company’s nonbank businesses. See Kros-
zner (1998b, 2000a).
18. Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996) provide evidence that voting in Congress for
the McFadden Act of 1927 responded to small state banks’ interests in limiting competition
from large national banks. See also White (1983) and Abrams and Settle (1993) for historical
opposition. On the small bank opposition to the recent branching deregulation, see Kane
(1996) and the Economist (1994).
19. Flannery (1984) shows that small banks in states with branching restrictions have
higher costs than do small banks in states without such restrictions.
Kennedy Amendment
Our last roll-call vote looks at the voting pattern on an amendment
brought by Kennedy (which failed) requiring banks authorized to buy or
open branches in other states to demonstrate that they are meeting the
existing credit needs of the community where they are currently estab-
lished, and to prohibit large banks (those with assets of more than $1 bil-
lion) from expanding to adjoining states if those banks have exhibited a
pattern of closing oﬃces in low- and moderate-income locations. The
amendment eﬀectively increases the costs of large banks acquiring small
banks through increased enforcement of community lending requirements.
The Kennedy Amendment goes somewhat further than Wylie-Neal, which
would have amended the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 to require
bank supervisors to maintain state-by-state evaluations of bank records of
lending to low-income neighborhoods.17
7.4 Hypotheses and Variable Deﬁnitions
7.4.1 Hypotheses
Intraindustry Rivalry
Small banks have fought to maintain and extend branching restrictions
and deposit insurance both historically and in the recent debates.18 Smaller
banks appear to have been the main winners from antibranching laws of
the nineteenth century and the 1930s because these restrictions protect
them from competition from larger and more eﬃcient banking organiza-
tions (see Flannery 1984; Jayaratne and Strahan 1998; and Winston 1993).
Branching restrictions thus tend to reduce the eﬃciency and consumer
convenience of the banking system.19 Small banks also have supported en-
hanced coverage of federal deposit insurance consistently since its passage
in the 1930s.
The interests within the banking industry regarding the Kennedy
Amendment depend on whether acquirers (large banks) or targets (small
ones) are more likely to bear the “tax” associated with greater scrutiny of
248 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan20. For a survey of the literature on takeovers, see Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell,
Brickley, and Netter (1988).
21. On the other hand, local banking monopolies created by branching restrictions could
strengthen relationships between banks and small- and medium-sized ﬁrms and increase the
availability of credit to these ﬁrms (Petersen and Rajan 1994). Also, some have argued that
small business lending declines when large banks take over small banks (e.g., Berger, Kash-
yap, and Scalise 1995).
their low-income and community development lending. Because prior re-
search suggests that most of the gains associated with takeovers accrue to
targets, we expect smaller banks to oppose this amendment.20 The private
interest theory therefore predicts that legislators from states with more
small banks will be more likely to oppose each of these three amendments.
Interindustry Rivalry
As broad competitors for household savings, the insurance industry
would tend to favor legislative changes that raise their rivals’ costs, and
vice versa. Thus, the private interest theory predicts that legislators from
states with a larger insurance industry would tend to oppose branching de-
regulation and to favor limits on deposit insurance. Because the Kennedy
Amendment eﬀectively raises the cost to banks wanting to open branches
across state lines, insurance would tend to favor this provision.
In addition, a number of states permit state-chartered commercial
banks to sell insurance. The insurance lobby would thus more intensely op-
pose the relaxation of branching restrictions on when banks can sell insur-
ance because such deregulation might permit banks to provide a more
eﬃcient insurance distribution network. Similarly, their support for limits
on deposit insuranceand the tax on banks expandinginto new states would
tend to be much greater in states where banks may sell insurance.
Consumer Interests
Banks are a major source of credit for small ﬁrms (Cole and Wolken
1994). Branching deregulation tends to reduce banks’ local market power
(Jayaratne and Strahan 1998). In addition, Strahan and Weston (1998) ﬁnd
that lending to small businesses increases on average when small banks
are purchased by other banking organizations, and Berger and colleagues
(1998) ﬁnd that credit availability to small businesses increases in the years
following a large banking organization’s takeover of a smaller bank. Be-
cause bank borrowers tend to beneﬁt from branching deregulation in par-
ticular and from bank consolidation in general, the private interest theory
would predict that legislators from states with numerous small, bank-
dependent ﬁrms would support branching deregulation.21
The vote to restrict deposit insurance would likely have its greatest eﬀect
on households that use banks and that would potentially be aﬀected by
limiting deposit insurance to a single account under $100,000. Because
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(1999).
elderly people typically have more liquid assets than younger people and
tend to use bank deposits as a savings vehicle, the private interest theory
suggests that legislators from states with more older people will be less
likely to vote to scale back on deposit insurance.
The Kennedy Amendment vote would likely increase lending to low-
income neighborhoods. Thus, the private interest theory suggests that vot-
ing in favor of this amendment is more likely among legislators from states
with more low-income people.
Political-Institutional Factors
Republicans are typically perceived as more likely to favor deregulation
than Democrats, so the political-institutional theories suggest that Demo-
crats would oppose branching deregulation and limits to deposit insur-
ance. In addition, Democrats are perceived to support the interests of
lower- and middle-income households, so they would tend to favor the
Kennedy Amendment.22 We also investigate whether voting behavior de-
pends on ideology and committee structure. Note that these political ef-
fects must be interpreted with caution, because the views of the politicians
may simply reﬂect the economic interests of the constituents in the state
(see Peltzman 1984).
7.4.2 Variable Deﬁnitions and Data Sources
Our main proxy for the strength of the small banks is the fraction of
banking assets in the state that is in small banks. We deﬁne banks as small
if they have assets below the median size in each state. By allowing the
deﬁnition of small to vary across states, we take into account cross-state
heterogeneity in bank sizes. We also include the median capital-asset ratio
for all banks operating in a state in our voting models, in part to control
for the fact that small banks typically hold more capital than do large
ones. In addition, well-capitalized banks may be more likely to support
limits to deposit insurance than poorly capitalized banks. Data on bank
size and capital are from the 1991 Reports of Income and Conditions (call
reports) from the Federal Reserve Board.
To measure the eﬀects of the rival insurance industry, we ﬁrst construct
an indicator variable that is 1 if the state permits banks to sell insurance.
For each state, we then measure the size of the insurance sector (total
value added in the state) relative to the sum of the banking and insurance
sectors in 1991. We will examine the eﬀect separately for states that per-
mit banks to sell insurance and those that do not. Data on value added
by industry are from U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic
250 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan23. Research relating voting to contribution levels has had mixed results when political
factors are controlled for (see Stratmann 1991 and 1995 for exceptions). Note that we cannot
distinguish whether money is inﬂuencing legislators to vote diﬀerently than they otherwise
would or whether money is being used to reward supporters and induce them to spend more
time working on the issue (see Bronars and Lott 1997 and Kroszner and Stratmann 1998,
1999).
24. Data on establishments by state are from 1987. See State and Metropolitan Data Book
(1991; available at http://ﬁsher.lib.virginia.edu/cbp/).
Analysis, Survey of Current Business (August 1994; available at http://
www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp/).
We also include the share of total contributions to each legislator from
banking and insurance that comes from the insurance industry. Previous
research on the relationship between contributions and votes has typically
included the level of giving by an interested group, but our emphasis here
is on the competition between the groups; hence we choose this relative
measure.23 Special interests sponsor political action committees (PACs)
that must disclose their contributions to the Federal Election Commission
(FEC). Corporations, for example, cannot legally give money directly to a
candidate for federal oﬃce, but must give through PACs. For each two-
year House election cycle, the FEC produces a ﬁle that identiﬁes the con-
tributing PAC, the recipient, and the dollar amount, and we use the data
from the 1991/92 cycle. We then identify which PACs are sponsored by the
banking industry or the insurance industry. The ﬁnancial services sector
is one of the largest contributors of PAC money, accounting for nearly 20
percent of the total (see Kroszner and Stratmann 1998). Because PAC
giving is negligible for challengers and for legislators in their last term,
we calculate the share of giving variable for only incumbents running for
reelection who receive at least some contributions from banking or insur-
ance. We then estimate all of our models with and without PAC contribu-
tions.
To measure the relative importance of small, bank-dependent borrow-
ers, we include the proportion of all establishments operating in the state
with fewer than twenty employees. These data are compiled by the Bureau
of the Census.24 Our measure of the importance of elderly constituents
equals the share of the population in the state over sixty-ﬁve, and our
measure of the importance of poor people equals the share of the popula-
tion below the poverty line. Each of these comes from the 1990 Census.
We include three political variables to test for the importance of party
politics, ideology, and committee structure. First, we include an indicator
equal to 1 if the legislator is a Democrat. Second, we include the Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores for each legislator. The ADA
scores are based on legislators’ past voting records, measured on a scale
of 0 to 1, where 1 represents the more liberal position on each vote. Third,
we include an indicator equal to 1 if the legislator is a member of the
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against the law.
House Banking Committee. The sample statistics for all the variables are
reported in table 7.3.
7.5 Methods and Results of the Voting Analysis
In order to determine the inﬂuence of the private interest and political-
institutional factors described earlier, we develop probit voting models for
the three roll-call amendment votes and the ﬁnal passage for FDICIA in
the House of Representatives.25 The dependent variable equals 1 if the
legislator voted in favor of the amendment or bill and 0 otherwise. In the
tables containing the results (tables 7.4–7.7), we report the marginal eﬀects
(slopes) of a one-unit change of each variable on the probability that a
legislator will vote in favor of the amendment or bill. Because we have
multiple legislators from each state, we adjust the standard errors to cor-
rect for the lack of independence among observations clustered in the
same state.
Table 7.3 Means and Standard Deviations for Voting Outcomes in the House of
Representatives on FDICIA and Amendments to FDICIA and Measures of the




Amendment vote to allow interstate branching 0.502 —
Amendment vote to limit deposit insurance 0.367 —
Amendment vote eﬀective to “tax” interstate bank acquisitions by encouraging
low-income lending 0.387 —
Final vote on FDICIA 0.804 —
Private interest variables
Assets in small banks/total bank assets 0.064 0.041
Value added in insurance/value added in insurance  depositories 0.412 0.069
Indicator for states where banks may sell insurance 0.123 —
Median bank capital/asset ratio 0.081 0.007
Insurance share of PAC dollars from insurance  banking 0.461 0.238
Small ﬁrm share of the number of ﬁrms in the state 0.878 0.029
Share of population below poverty line 0.141 0.031
Share of population over 65 0.127 0.020
Political/institutional variables
Indicator equals 1 for Democrat 0.618 —
ADA score (from 0 to 1, least to most liberal) 0.470 0.335
Indicator for member of House Banking Committee 0.120 —
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two columns are the same for all four votes. Column 1 contains the private
interest and political-institutional factors described earlier, with the excep-
tion of the PAC contribution variable. Column 2 then adds this variable,
which reduces the sample size by roughly 30 percent. The last two columns
repeat the speciﬁcations from the ﬁrst two but include additional variables
representing the private interest of nonﬁnancial services groups speciﬁ-
cally aﬀected by each amendment. For the ﬁnal FDICIA vote, we include
all three of these private consumer interest variables.
7.5.1 Amendment to Permit Interstate Branching (Wylie-Neal)
Table 7.4 contains the results for the vote on the amendment to relax
restrictions on interstate banking and branching. The negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the relative share of small bank assets in the
state suggests that legislators from areas with a large share of small banks
tended to oppose this amendment. This is consistent with the intraindustry
rivalry hypothesis. The share of small banks also has a large eﬀe c to nt h e
probability that a legislator votes for branching: A 1–standard deviation
increase in small bank market share reduces the probability of voting for
branching deregulation by roughly 20 to 25 percent, depending on the
speciﬁcation.
We also ﬁnd support for the interindustry rivalry hypothesis. Where
banks can sell insurance, legislators from states with larger insurance sec-
tors relative to banking are less likely to vote for the amendment. In states
where banks cannot sell insurance, however, the eﬀect of the relative size
of the insurance sector is positive in all four speciﬁcations and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in columns 1 and 3. In the speciﬁcations without PAC
money, 1–standard deviation increase in the insurance share decreases the
probability of voting for branching by 17 percent in states where banks
may sell insurance, but increases the probability of voting for branching
by about 11 percent in states where banks may not sell insurance. This
support may be due to the inclusion of provisions within the amendment
to limit national banks’ insurance powers partially. As we noted earlier,
the insurance industry was losing court battles to keep banks from enter-
ing the insurance business and, as a whole, lobbied for speciﬁc legislative
restrictions on banks’ insurance powers.
By combining the branching provisions with limitations on bank pow-
ers, the amendment appears to have split the insurance industry. Further
evidence of this interpretation is found in columns 2 and 4, which include
the share of PAC contributions from the insurance industry. This variable
does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on voting patterns on this
amendment, but it does in all of the other votes we consider. With the
insurance interests split on the amendment, contributions from the insur-
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Representatives on an Amendment (Wylie-Neal) Related to FDICIA to Relax
Restrictions on Interstate Branching to Measures of the Size and Strength of
Interest Groups in Financial Services and Political-Institutional Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets in small banks/total 5.08*** 5.98*** 4.97*** 5.96***
bank assets (0.92) (1.08) (0.92) (1.09)
Value added in insurance/value 1.57** 1.12 1.45** 1.09
added in insurance  (0.62) (0.76) (0.61) (0.77)
depositories where banks
may not sell insurance
Indicator for states where 0.69*** 0.84* 0.70*** 0.84*
banks may sell insurance (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12)
Value added in insurance/value 2.42** 6.76* 2.55** 6.87*
added in insurance  (1.16) (3.80) (1.17) (3.81)
depositories where banks
may sell insurance
Median bank capital/asset 0.50 2.56 1.24 2.39
ratio (5.00) (5.96) (5.14) (6.06)
Share of PAC contributions — 0.11 — 0.11
from insurance (0.13) (0.13)
Small ﬁrm share of the number —— 1.13 0.34
of ﬁrms in the state (0.71) (1.34)
Indicator for Democrat 0.26** 0.15 0.26** 0.15
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
ADA score 0.23* 0.34*** 0.24* 0.34***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Indicator for member of House 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Banking Committee (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
No. of observations 409 293 409 293
Pseudo-R2 0.1971 0.2145 0.1992 0.2148
2 for joint signiﬁcance 83.60 88.42 92.40 90.93
(p-value) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001)
Incremental R2
Private interest variables 0.1045 0.1448 0.1065 0.1450
Political variables 0.0870 0.0632 0.0860 0.0634
Notes: The table reports the marginal eﬀect of a small change in each variable from its mean on the
probability that the House member votes in favor of the proposal. For indicator variables, the coeﬃcient
represents the change in the probability for a one unit change in the indicator. Each model contains
one observation for each vote. The explanatory variables reﬂect average measures of interest group
strength in the states. Standard errors are adjusted to reﬂect the fact that votes from House members
from the same state may be aﬀected by common factors not included in the model. The marginal eﬀects
are reported with their standard errors in parentheses. The pseudo-R2 is based on Estrella (1998). The
incremental R2 is the change in the pseudo-R2 that results when we add the private interest (political)
variables to the model.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.26. We do not investigate the question of how amendments and bills with diﬀerent charac-
teristics and combinations of provisions get to a roll-call vote.
27. The signiﬁcance of splitting industry interests in order to achieve regulatory change is
not unique to ﬁnancial services. Heterogeneity of interests between interstate and intrastate
airlines and the breakdown of a uniﬁed opposition to deregulation among the major inter-
state carriers was important to bringing about the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (see
Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan 1985). Divide-and-conquer strategies also have played an im-
portant role in eﬀecting economic reforms in Russia (see Shleifer and Treisman 2000).
28. In earlier work on state-level (not federal interstate) branching deregulation, we do ﬁnd
that states with more small ﬁrms relaxed their restrictions on branching earlier than did
states with fewer small ﬁrms. See Kroszner and Strahan (1999).
ance industry may be supporting both sides of the issue and, in eﬀect,
canceling out or at least mitigating the net inﬂuence of this interest group.26
A divide-and-conquer strategy thus may be eﬀective in neutralizing oppo-
sition to a bill, but it also demonstrates the obstacles to optimal policy;
that is, compromises to pacify at least some segment of the aﬀected indus-
tries may be required to secure passage of regulatory reform.27
We do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the share of small ﬁrms
in the state. Even though this group of consumers of banking services
would be directly aﬀected by the regulatory change, they do not appear to
have had an impact on the voting pattern.28
Turning to the political-institutional factors, partisanship and our mea-
sure of ideology do appear to play a role. The Democrats tended to vote
against this deregulatory measure, holding the ADA score constant. The
coeﬃcient suggests that Democrats were 15 to 25 percent more likely to
oppose branching than were Republicans. In addition, holding party mem-
bership constant, the more liberal members of the House also were more
likely to vote against this amendment. Based on the ADA score, the most
liberal legislator was 23 to 34 percent more likely to oppose branching
than was the most conservative one. The eﬀect of membership on the
House Banking Committeeis small and statisticallyinsigniﬁcant. This sug-
gests that there is no particular bias of the Banking Committee members,
relative to the House as a whole, on this issue. This result is consistent with
thecontrastingintra-andinterindustryinterestsbeingrepresentedbymem-
bers of the Banking Committee (see Kroszner and Stratmann 1998).
At the bottom of table 7.4, we report a goodness of ﬁt measure that
is roughly analogous to the traditional R2 following Estrella (1998). To
determine the marginal contribution of the private interest variables rela-
tive to the political-institutional factors, we calculate the incremental R2,
deﬁned as the change in the goodness-of-ﬁt measure when we add one or
the other group of variables to the probit equation. In each speciﬁcation,
the incremental contribution of the private interest variables is greater
than that of the political-institutional variables, but the contribution of
the latter is not negligible, so both sets of factors should be taken into
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 255account when trying to understand the political economy of regulatory
change.
7.5.2 Amendment to Limit Deposit Insurance (Wylie)
The analysis of the vote on the amendment to limit deposit insurance
coverage is reported in table 7.5. Smaller, less diversiﬁed banks tend to
reap a greater beneﬁt from the deposit insurance system than do larger
banks, and this intraindustry rivalry is evident in the voting pattern. Legis-
lators from areas where small banks have a relatively large market share
Table 7.5 Marginal Eﬀects from Probit Model Relating Voting Outcomes in the House of
Representatives on an Amendment (Wylie) Related to FDICIA to Limit Deposit
Insurance to a Single Account to Measures of the Size and Strength of Interest
Groups in Financial Services and Political-Institutional Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets in small banks/total 4.15*** 5.04*** 4.13*** 5.04***
bank assets (0.67) (0.85) (0.66) (0.85)
Value added in insurance/value 0.79* 1.18** 0.72* 1.17**
added in insurance  (0.41) (0.51) (0.43) (0.51)
depositories where banks
may not sell insurance
Indicator for states where 0.62*** 0.85*** 0.62*** 0.85***
banks may sell insurance (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Value added in insurance/value 5.84*** 11.23*** 5.82*** 11.23***
added in insurance  (1.15) (1.46) (1.16) (1.46)
depositories where banks
may sell insurance
Median bank capital/asset 1.45 3.82 0.95 3.74
ratio (4.29) (4.66) (4.46) (4.84)
Share of PAC contributions — 0.32*** — 0.32***
from insurance (0.11) (0.12)
Percent of population over 65 —— 0.56 0.08
(1.38) (1.38)
Indicator for Democrat 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
ADA score 0.14** 0.09 0.14* 0.09
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10)
Indicator for member of House 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06
Banking Committee (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13)
No. of observations 406 285 406 285
Pseudo-R2 0.1079 0.1627 0.1082 0.1627
2 for joint signiﬁcance 63.88 83.10 78.14 90.06
(p-value) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001)
Incremental R2
Private interest variables 0.1012 0.1619 0.1016 0.1619
Political variables 0.0087 0.0041 0.0084 0.0040
Notes: See table 7.4.
256 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahanconsistently oppose this amendment. Again, the eﬀect of small bank share
is economically relevant: A 1–standard deviation increase in this variable
is associated with a 20–25 percent decrease in the probability of voting to
limit deposit insurance. In addition, although it is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, we do ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on the median capital ratio of banks
in the state.
The interindustry rivalry also is manifest in the vote on this amendment.
The insurance industry generally favors measures that would reduce im-
plicit government subsidy to the banking industry through federal deposit
insurance. Regardless of whether banks can sell insurance products in the
state, a larger insurance sector relative to banking in the state increases the
likelihood that a legislator will support the amendment. The magnitude of
the eﬀect is much larger for legislators from states where banks do have
insurance powers, but the coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant for both groups. For instance, a 1–standard deviation increase in the
insurance share raises the probability that a legislator votes to limit deposit
insurance by 40 percent in states where banks may sell insurance; in states
where banks may not sell insurance, a 1–standard deviation increase in
the insurance share raises this probability by only about 5 percent. This
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. In addition, a
legislator who receives a high proportion of PAC contributions from the
insurance industry relative to banking is more likely to support the
amendment.
As we noted earlier, older people who tend to hold relatively large
amounts of wealth in depository institutions preferred to keep the existing
deposit insurance structure that permitted multiple accounts to be in-
sured. Our proxy for this consumer interest is the percent of the population
over 65 in each state, and we include this variable in columns 3 and 4. As
with the other consumer interest variables, this one appears to have little
eﬀect on the voting pattern.
Unlike for the other two amendment votes analyzed, the political factors
contribute very little beyond the information contained in the private inter-
est variables. The eﬀect of the Democratic Party indicator variable is negli-
gible and not statistically signiﬁc a n t .I ns p e c i ﬁcations 2 and 4 the ADA
rating does have a small statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, but the eﬀect is even
smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant in the other two speciﬁcations.
Membership on the House Banking Committee again appears to have no
impact. The incremental R2 calculation shows that virtually all of the ex-
planatory power is from the private interest variables.
7.5.3 Amendment to Raise Eﬀective Cost of Acquisition
through Low-Income Lending Enforcement (Kennedy)
Table 7.6 reports the results for the amendment that would increase the
scrutiny of an acquiring bank’s low-income lending. As with voting on the
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 257branching amendment, legislators from areas with a larger relative market
share of small banks tend to oppose this amendment. Brickley and James
(1987) found that the premium paid to targets of bank mergers increases
with the number of potential bidders for the target banks. Because this
amendment would have been likely to reduce the number of bidders from
out of state available to take over a bank that was in trouble (and small
banks tended to be experiencing greater distress relative to larger, more
diversiﬁed banks during this time period), small banks might have found
Table 7.6 Marginal Eﬀects from Probit Model Relating Voting Outcomes in the House of
Representatives on an Amendment (Kennedy) Related to FDICIA Eﬀectively to
“Tax” Interstate Acquisitions by Encouraging Low Income Lending by Acquiring
Banks to Measures of the Size and Strength of Interest Groups in Financial
Services and Political-Institutional Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets in small banks/total 2.56** 2.88** 2.41* 2.68
bank assets (1.23) (1.44) (1.38) (1.65)
Value added in insurance/value 0.65 1.14* 0.50 0.95
added in insurance  (0.63) (0.65) (0.60) (0.60)
depositories where banks
may not sell insurance
Indicator for states where 0.58** 0.70*** 0.57** 0.67**
banks may sell insurance (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
Value added in insurance/value 4.13*** 6.65*** 3.77** 6.02***
added in insurance  (1.45) (1.75) (1.66) (2.28)
depositories where banks
may sell insurance
Median bank capital/asset 5.02 1.31 5.62 0.33
ratio (5.89) (7.34) (5.67) (7.16)
Share of PAC contributions — 0.29*** — 0.28***
from insurance (0.10) (0.10)
Share of population below —— 0.01 0.01
poverty line (0.01) (0.02)
Indicator for Democrat 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.43***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
ADA score 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Indicator for member of House 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Banking Committee (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
No. of observations 383 270 383 270
Pseudo-R2 0.2283 0.2226 0.2291 0.2238
2 for joint signiﬁcance 113.79 95.40 132.85 107.15
(p-value) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001)
Incremental R2
Private interest variables 0.0658 0.0810 0.0667 0.0823
Political variables 0.1598 0.1383 0.1606 0.1393
Notes: See table 7.4.
258 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahanit in their interests to lobby against this measure to try to raise the price
at which they might sell out to the entering banks.
Where banks could sell insurance, legislators from states with larger in-
surance sectors relative to banking tended to support the amendment.
Again, the magnitude of this eﬀe c ti sl a r g e :A1 –standard deviation in-
crease in the insurance share raises the probability that a legislator votes
to tax the bank takeover market by about 30 percent. In these states, the
insurance industry did not wish to allow new (and presumably stronger)
bank competitors to enter the market. Where banks did not have insurance
powers, the relative size of the insurance industry does not appear to have
h a dm u c ho fa ne ﬀect. In columns 2 and 4, which include the PAC contri-
bution variable, we ﬁnd that legislators who receive a high share of their
contributions from insurance relative to banking tended to support the
amendment. Generally, the insurance industry opposed legislation relax-
ing constraintsonthegeographicexpansionofbanksunlessprovisionswere
included to limit banks’ insurance powers (and no such provisions were
part of this amendment). There was nothing in this amendment to divide
the insurance industry into opposing sides, although the part of the indus-
try that was facing a more direct threat from banks appears to have been
more active in inﬂuencing legislators.
In columns 3 and 4 we include the share of the population below the
poverty line as a rough proxy for a consumer interest that would have
beneﬁtted from this amendment. Once again, this consumer interest vari-
able has a very small and not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the voting
patterns. The poor may not be a particularly well-organized interest. Also,
people who are more aﬄuent are more likely to vote than those who are
less aﬄuent. It also could be that poverty is correlated with the partisan
and ideological variables we now analyze.
In contrast to the previous amendments, this issue appears to have been
highly partisan. Democratic Party members were about 45 percent more
likely to vote for this amendment than were Republicans. Our ideology
measure, however, does not have any explanatory power beyond what is
already implicitly captured in the Democrat indicator. Once again, mem-
bership on the House Banking Committee does not appear to have an
impact. When we examine the incremental R2,w eﬁnd that the political
factors have a greater marginal explanatory power than do the private in-
terest variables. The private interest variables, however, still make a non-
negligible contribution to the goodness of ﬁt.
7.5.4 Final Vote on FDICIA
Table 7.7 contains the results for the ﬁnal passage of FDICIA. In con-
trast to the three amendment votes, none of the speciﬁcations pass a chi-
square test for joint statistical signiﬁcance of the regressors. The R2 is an
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 259order of magnitude lower than for the amendment votes and never exceeds
3 percent. The marginal eﬀects for all of the variables that were statistically
signiﬁcant in the amendment voting equations are much smaller in magni-
tude here. In columns 1 and 3 none of the variables are individually statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. In columns 2 and 4 the relative market share of small
banks and the relative share of PAC contributions from the insurance in-
dustry do have small statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Table 7.7 Marginal Eﬀects from Probit Model Relating Voting Outcomes in the House of
Representatives on FDICIA to Measures of the Size and Strength of Interest
Groups in Financial Services and Political-Institutional Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets in small banks/total 0.96 1.20* 1.10 1.37*
bank assets (0.62) (0.68) (0.66) (0.82)
Value added in insurance/value 0.32 0.10 0.14 0.19
added in insurance  (0.58) (0.50) (0.57) (0.51)
depositories where banks
may not sell insurance
Indicator for states where 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.04
banks may sell insurance (0.41) (0.26) (0.56) (0.67)
Value added in insurance/value 0.37 0.38 0.03 0.22
added in insurance  (1.18) (1.38) (1.30) (1.83)
depositories where banks
may sell insurance
Median bank capital/asset 0.79 0.07 0.24 0.01
ratio (5.40) (4.93) (5.32) (5.26)
Share of PAC contributions — 0.13** — 0.13**
from insurance (0.06) (0.06)
Small ﬁrm share of the number —— 0.25 0.15
of ﬁrms in the state (0.87) (0.83)
Percent of population below —— 0.01 0.01
poverty line (0.01) (0.01)
Percent of population over 65 —— 0.31 0.90
(1.56) (1.70)
Indicator for Democrat 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
ADA score 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Indicator for member of House 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04
Banking Committee (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
No. of observations 417 292 417 292
Pseudo-R2 0.0182 0.0275 0.0219 0.0304
2 for joint signiﬁcance 4.63 7.85 5.23 8.00
(p-value) (0.80) (0.55) (0.92) (0.78)
Incremental R2
Private interest variables 0.0140 0.0220 0.0177 0.0249
Political variables 0.0047 0.0030 0.0053 0.0032
Notes: See table 7.4.
260 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan29. Consistent with this idea, Strahan and Suﬁ (2000) ﬁnd that competing interests in
banking, securities, and insurance experienced positive stock price reactions following pas-
sage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
30. Our proxy for the institutional structure of decision making, the Banking Committee
membership indicator, did not have an impact. A cross-country comparison would allow
for greater variation in the structures and a more thorough analysis of the role of political
institutions, but such a study is beyond the scope of this paper. On the international political
economy of ﬁnancial regulation, see Kroszner (1998a, 1999a, and 2000b).
The contrast between the ability of the private interest group and
political-institutional factors to explain the voting patterns on the amend-
ments but not on the ﬁnal passage suggests that the ﬁnal bill was a “Christ-
mas tree” compromise that included some provision to satisfy each constit-
uency. The amendments are much more focused on speciﬁc issues, where
it is easier to deﬁne whose interests would be favored. The ﬁnal bill is an
amalgam of such haggling and logrolling. This could be thought to repre-
sent a version of the divide-and-conquer strategy: In order for a bill con-
cerning fundamental change to banking supervision and regulation to be
successful, provisions must be included to pacify rival interests. The neces-
sity of satisfying and balancing the competing interests places obstacles in
the path to optimal reforms, but an awareness of this requirement can help
to shape welfare-improving policy reforms that can build coalitions for
ﬁnal passage.29
7.6 Conclusions
Our results suggest that interest group competition and the battle
among the interests are key determinants to explaining regulatory out-
comes. Partisanship and ideology also appear to play important roles.30 By
the late 1980s, the demise of the thrift industry allowed many economists
to argue persuasively that the moral hazard problem associated with de-
posit insurance could be very costly. Numerous reforms were proposed,
but only some could be integrated successfully into the FDICIA. Debate
over the legislation illustrated that policy makers were aware of ways to
reduce moral hazard without eliminating the potential beneﬁts of the ﬁ-
nancial safety net. Our positive analysis of roll-call votes shows, however,
that reforms such as branching deregulation and limits to deposit insur-
ance were diﬃcult to put into law due to resistance both within banking
and from rival segments of the ﬁnancial industry. Without an interest
group to champion a position, an argument may have little eﬀect.
Our results also illustrate how competition among rival interest groups
can increase the likelihood of beneﬁcial reform. Rival groups have an in-
centive to battle each other in addition to battling the consumer. If they
dissipate their eﬀorts against each other, they are less likely to be able to
support narrow special interest regulation. A divide-and-conquer strategy
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 261was used to split the insurance industry’s interest in attempting to pass
branching deregulation. The insurance industry had traditionally opposed
branch banking both because it competes with banks for household sav-
ings, and because banks’ abilities to sell insurance products had been ex-
panding over time. The Wylie-Neal Amendment would have permitted
more branching while limiting national banks’ insurance powers, thereby
gaining the favor of the insurance industry in states where state-chartered
banks could not sell insurance. Heterogeneity in the interests of large and
small banks also helped to make welfare-improving legislation more fea-
sible.
For economists arguing for welfare-enhancing reforms, it is important
to take into account the necessity of satisfying and balancing competing
interests and understanding the role of political-institutional factors (Ro-
drik 1996). These may place obstacles in the path to optimal reforms, but
an awareness of addressing the diﬀerent constituencies can help shape
policy reforms that can build coalitions for ﬁnal passage of welfare-
improving legislation.
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Comment Jeremy C. Stein
The paper by Kroszner and Strahan is a very interesting and extremely
well-done positive analysis of bank regulation. Kroszner and Strahan seek
to understand a fundamental question about ﬁnancial regulation (and reg-
ulation more generally), namely: What role do various economic and polit-
ical forces play in shaping these laws?
Because I ﬁnd Kroszner and Strahan’s empirical work to be clear-cut
and convincing, I will not quibble in any way with their speciﬁcations or
their regression results. Rather, I will try to provide an interpretation of
what exactly—in terms of broad lessons—one might take away from these
regressions. To begin, it is helpful to note that one can ask diﬀerent ver-
sions of the basic positive question that Kroszner and Strahan pose:
Question 1 (static version): Why do we have the (possibly suboptimal) laws
we do? Which types of bad laws are most likely to exist?
Question 2 (dynamic version): Why and when do laws change? Do they
respond well to shocks in the external economic environment?
Question 3 (cross-country version): Why do some countries have worse
laws than others?
One type of answer—the one favored by Kroszner and Strahan—has
to do with special interests. For example, restrictions on interbank compe-
tition, as well as excessively generous deposit insurance, can be expected
to beneﬁt banks, and especially small banks. In contrast, although restric-
tions on bank competition may also beneﬁt insurance companies, insurers
are likely to be hurt by excessive deposit insurance, particularly if they
compete directly with banks. These observations lead to sharp predictions
about how congressional voting on various issues will be inﬂuenced by the
relative strength of the banking and insurance lobbies, among other
factors.
Note, however, that at least in principle it is possible that a private inter-
est approach may be more successful in providing answers to the static
version of the question, question 1, than to the dynamic or cross-country
versions, question 2 or question 3. Suppose that the rents accruing to the
banking sector as a result of anticompetitive regulation are large but do
not vary much over time and across countries. Then the existence of a
strong banking lobby can help explain why such anticompetitive laws are
on the books, but it may not give us much insight into why such laws are
changed at a particular point in time.
With this observation in mind, let me very brieﬂy review the Kroszner
and Strahan’s results. In all their regressions, the variables on the left-hand
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on various amendments to FDICIA. That is, the regressions seek to ex-
plain the voting patterns of individual house members. In table 7.4 the
amendment being voted on is the Wylie-Neal amendment, which would
both relax restrictions on interstate branching as well as limit national
banks’ insurance powers. Consistent with the private interest approach,
Kroszner and Strahan ﬁnd that house members tend to (a) vote “no” if
they are from a state with many small banks; (b) vote “no” if they are from
a state that has many insurance companies and that allows banks and
insurers to compete directly; and (c) vote “yes” if they are from a state
that has many insurance companies, but where banks and insurers do not
compete with one another.
In table 7.5 the amendment being considered would limit deposit insur-
ance coverage. Again, the private interest variables loom large. House
members tend to (a) vote “no” if they are from a small-bank state, (b) vote
“yes” if they are from an insurance industry–heavy state, and (c) vote
“yes” if they receive PAC money from the insurance industry. As with
table 7.4 one of the really interesting things that comes out in the data is
the way in which diﬀerent industries can be played oﬀ against one another,
based on their conﬂicting economic interests.
Finally, in table 7.6 the amendment being voted on is one that would
raise the eﬀective cost of making banking acquisitions, by scrutinizing an
acquiring bank’s low-income lending policies. Here, too, the private inter-
est variables have some explanatory power, with members tending to (a)
vote “no” if they are from a small-bank state, (b) vote “yes” if they are
from an insurance industry–heavy state, and (c) vote “yes” if they receive
PAC money from the insurance industry. However, in this case the most
dominant variable is not a private interest one, but a partisan one: Being
a Democrat is the single strongest predictor of whether a member votes
“yes.”
Overall, I would interpret the results in the following way. The regres-
sions do an extremely impressive job of explaining variation in individual
members’ votes, based on the members’ home-state economic interests,
the PAC money they receive, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, their party
aﬃliation. This strong explanatory power can be seen in the high pseudo-
R2s of the regressions, which are for the most part in the range of 20
percent.
What do these results tell us about variation in regulatory outcomes,
however? And what sort of variation are they best suited to explaining:
time series, or cross-sectional? In other words, to what extent do the regres-
sion results map directly into question 1, 2, or 3? Kroszner and Strahan
argue that there is a very direct mapping: “Our results suggest that interest
group competition and the battle among the interests are a key determi-
nant to explaining regulatory outcomes” (261). Although this claim may
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distance between the authors’ results for individual members’ voting pat-
terns and any conclusions about regulatory outcomes.
This point is best illustrated with an example. Suppose that every year,
a nine-member House committee takes up a proposal to cap damage
awards from tobacco litigation. Four of the members of the committee are
from tobacco states, and always vote “yes.” Four of the members are from
states with big law ﬁrm lobbies, and always vote “no.” The ﬁnal member
is from a neutral state, and the vote is eﬀectively random from year to year.
If we were to run a regression to explain individual member votes based
on tobacco and law ﬁrm economic inﬂuence variables, we would get an R2
close to 1. Even so, however, we cannot predict at all whether the measure
will pass in a given year, nor can we explain any time variation in the
outcome of the vote. There is a simple moral here: Competing economic
interests may be good at explaining the tails of the voting distribution, and
hence may help to generate high R2s in the sort of regressions that Kros-
zner and Strahan run. But the voting outcome—unlike, say, market de-
mand—is driven by the person in the middle of the distribution, and it
may well be that this median voter’s preferences are harder to understand
in terms of private economic interests. In the case of the tobacco example,
the median voter may be much more inﬂuenced by changing social views
about smoking, personal experience with a relative who got lung cancer,
a n ds oo n .
Although the example suggests that, as a matter of logic, one should be
a bit cautious in mapping the authors’ regressions directly into statements
about regulatory outcomes, it is not clear how much weight this caveat
deserves in practice. My tentative guess is that the caveat is less relevant
for question 1. Said diﬀerently, I am more comfortable concluding that the
authors’ type of analysis allows us to speak pretty directly to question 1.
To go back to the tobacco example, if eight of the nine committee mem-
bers were from tobacco states, a private interest model would do a very
good job of explaining why, in steady-state, we observe a cap.
On the other hand, I am less convinced that the authors’ type of analysis
can speak directly to Q2, because at the time that a law gets changed, it
is, almost by deﬁnition, one that is on the cusp—that is, one in which, like
in the ﬁrst variant of the tobacco example, the median voter (who is neu-
tral based on private economic interests) is more likely to be pivotal.
This is, of course, not to say that private interest variables cannot ulti-
mately explain at least some aspects of the dynamics of regulation. Indeed,
in section 7.3 of their paper, Kroszner and Strahan argue that banking
reform occurred in the 1980s and 1990s—as opposed to earlier—in part
because the balance of power in the industry changed in such a way as to
alter the relative strength of various lobbies. This seems like an eminently
plausible hypothesis. My only point is that the evidence that Kroszner and
Obstacles to Optimal Policy 269Strahan present in their paper, while suggestive, does not really provide a
decisive test of this sort of private interest hypothesis of regulatory dy-
namics.
Discussion Summary
Charles Calomiris began the discussion by asking about the use of probits
for this type of analysis. He pointed out that political scientists note that
in close votes, party discipline may be higher, resulting in a poorer model
ﬁt. He pointed out also that the authors ﬁnd high pseudo-R2s even in the
closer votes. He wondered about diﬀerences between the amendments and
the ﬁnal vote. He also suggested the inclusion of additional demographic
variables, noting that demographic variables such as industry composition
and rural population have mattered in past research and are likely to be
correlated with the included explanatory variables.
Raghuram Rajan wondered why agreements could not be reached
through rent sharing (and not through the death of small banks).
Mark Flannery advocated naı ¨vete ´ in formulating policy advice. He
asked whether economists should necessarily focus on what is feasible.
Frederic Mishkin noted, however, that the route to achieve optimal policy
might be important.
James Wilcox focused on the positive rather than normative ﬁndings,
n o t i n gt h a ti ti sd i ﬃcult to identify Pareto or social welfare–improving
laws. He also noted the fresh water eﬀect—that is, the concentration of
unit banking states away from the two coasts. He suggested that state regu-
lations and preferences may inﬂuence the distribution of banking assets
within a state and, in turn, the characteristics of a state’s representatives.
Mark Carey, picking up on a question raised by the discussant, won-
dered which countries’ political systems and laws are associated with good
regulation. He suggested that it will be interesting to observe, as sound
policies are advocated by some, how these are implemented across coun-
tries.
Finally, Mark Gertler suggested a diﬀerent approach to this problem
by focusing on the median voter. He suggested that the authors look at
representatives who voted in opposite directions for the diﬀerent amend-
ments.
Randy Kroszner began his response by noting the diﬃculties associated
with the median voter approach. He pointed out that some of his other
work suggests entrenchment and support for clearly stated positions. He
noted that only when there are broad technological or economic shocks
that change the support among the constituents or the proﬁtability to the
diﬀerent groups do we see changes in outcomes.
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the important role of foreign banks. He observed that these institutions
would typically not be part of the political process, but may be interesting
actors. In response to Wilcox, he agreed that there is a risk in designating
policies as good or bad for certain interest groups. He noted that in a pre-
vious paper with Strahan, they looked at endogenous interest group forma-
tion, and found that this did not seem to change other results. He did agree
that this was an interesting dynamic that occurs as regulation can create
interest groups.
He also supported Flannery’s assertion, noting that truth is just another
special interest group and one that is not well funded. He observed that
academics could aﬀect the productivity of the dollars spent by the diﬀerent
interest groups. He also agreed with Rajan that the dynamics of change
will be interesting and that the authors need to consider how to generalize
their results.
Finally, in response to Calomiris he noted that political scientists would
often include a political party indicator variable that helps explain many
votes—in particular, the partisan (and often not close) votes. This might
explain the high R2 in many studies where the votes were not close.
In response to Rajan, Philip Strahan noted that there is some evidence
of transfers among the various groups that are aﬀected. For example, he
noted that state branching requires banks to buy existing branches (or
banks), resulting in a payoﬀ to incumbents. One challenge, he observed,
is how to share these payoﬀs among the smaller banks. Finally, he also
noted that other variables, including indicators for unit banking and rural
versus urban areas, had been examined and were not found to change
the results.
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